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ABSTRACT
The Space Transportation System (STS) fleet has flown more than sixty missions over the fourteen
years since its first flight. As a result of encounters with on-orbit particulates (space debris and micro-
meteoroids), 177 impact features (chips) have been found on the STS outer windows (through STS-65).
Forty-five of the damages were large enough to warrant replacement of the window.
NASA's orbital operations and vehicle inspection procedures have changed over the history of the
shuttle program, in response to concerns about the orbital environment and the cost of maintaining the
space shuttle. These programmatic issues will be discussed, including safety concerns, maintenance
issues, inspection procedures and flight rule changes.
Examples of orbital debris impacts to the shuttle windows will be provided. There will also be a
brief discussion of the impact properties of glass and what design changes have been considered to
improve the impact properties of the windows.
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1. Background
The Space Shuttle fleet has flown more than sixty missions since the first Shuttle was launched in
April 1981. In its wide variety of mission profiles, including satellite launches and repairs, DOD
missions, Earth science, microgravity research and astronomy, the windows on the flight deck have
functioned as more than the pilot's windscreen. The outer panes of the windshield serve as a critical
part of the thermal protection system, keeping the high heat of reentry away from the manned
compartment of the vehicle. The inner panes form part of the pressure vessel where the crew lives.
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The outer pane, also called the thermal pane, is a .6 inch thick plate of fused silica glass, approx-
imately 35" x 45". There are six thermal panes in the windshield, two in the overhead windows
(observation windows) and one in the side hatch. These nine thermal panes have been our "experiment
of opporttmity" for evaluating the effects of the low earth orbit micrometeoroid and debris environment
on the Shuttle program.
This paper will discuss the results of this "experiment" and what we have done and plan to do to
deal with the low earth orbit environment and its interaction with the Shuttle windows. The data for the
"experiment" is collected by the window inspectors at Kennedy Space Center (KSC), who examine the
thermal panes for damage after every flight.
1.1 Window Inspection
The window inspection is a crucial part of a Shuttle vehicle's turnaround processing. Technicians
clean the thermal panes with a soft cloth and water, and polish off deposits from the flight if necessary.
Then they examine the entire surface very carefully, using a hand-held magnifying lens and bright lights
to f'md features as small as .0006" in depth. A record of each window's surface features is maintained
from flight to flight so that new items can be identified. When a scratch, pit or bruise is found, the
depth is measured by taking a mold impression of the damage and measuring the mold prof'de with a
f'me stylus and microscope. This data is recorded on a Problem Report (PR) form, and the next step in
window processing is performed by stress analysts at KSC and JSC.
1.2 Window Damage Analysis
The strength of the thermal pane is important because the pane must remain intact throughout all
flight regimes so that it may provide the thermal protection it is designed for. During the launch and
entry phase of flight the thermal pane has a pressure load across it; this load provides the design stresses
for the window. Since the pane's strength is directly related to its surface condition, any damages on a
window can greatly reduce the strength. The purpose of a post-flight stress analysis for a damaged
window is to determine whether the pane has enough residual strength to remain installed.
Stress analysts use the depth of the flaw in a formula that NASA has determined will give a
conservative estimate of the residual strength. The analysis also includes an assessment of the
remaining life of the window, since glass strength decreases with time under load. Damaged windows
that cannot show adequate life or strength are removed from the vehicle and usually scrapped. In some
cases, the window can be flipped over and installed in the opposite position in the vehicle. Each
window costs the Government between $30,000 and $50,000. As of December 1994, 45 windows have
been replaced because of impact damage, at an average rate of one window for every 10.8 days in orbit.
2. Window Impact History
The PR's record all damages above a certain size and usually differentiate between impact pits,
scratches and bruises, since the morphology is quite different for these three types of damage.
However, very small features (those smaller than .0006" depth) may not be accurately identified all the
time. Inspectors are not required to report damages with depth less than .0006".
Scratches in a window's surface are caused by handling and tool contact and are not counted in the
impact history. Bruises are thought to be caused by impact, but it is believed that they are evidence of
low velocity events that occur on the ground or during atmospheric flight. Bruises are not counted in
the orbital impact history.
Hypervelocityimpactpitsin fusedsilicahaveveryspecificharacteristics.Thevisiblecrateris
roughlycircular,withacentralpit identifiedbydensercrazing.Figure2 showsasketchof atypical
crater.
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2.1 Impact count
Typical hypervelocity crater in fused silica glass
Figure 2
A total of 177 impacts has been reported since STS-1. The number of reported impacts per flight
day fits a Poisson distribution reasonably well, as shown in Figure 3. All impact events are not
reported, because many craters are too small to detect with our current techniques and because flight
safety is not affected by impact craters smaller than .0006" in depth.
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Figure4 showstheprogramhistoryof impactsandremovals.Thenoticeableincreasein reported
impactsmaybeduetorecentlyimprovedinspectionproceduresatKSC.Someof theimpactsreported
in recentflightsmaybeartifactsfromearliermissions.
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The impacts are distributed among the windows relative to their position on the vehicle. Assuming
the vehicle is flying with its nose in the velocity vector, the forward windows are expected to have the
highest impact count, since they have the largest projected area when the Shuttle's longitudinal axis is in
the velocity vector. The overhead and side hatch windows are expected to have the fewest impacts.
Figure 5 shows the flight data, which demonstrates this expected impact distribution, except for the
left middle and side windows, which have more and fewer impacts compared to the right windows,
respectfully. A review of the Shuttle program's flight history 1 indicates that the right wing is directed
into the velocity vector more frequently than the left, and the nose is in the velocity vector the most of
any identifiable direction (see Figure 6). The "other" directions in Figure 6 comprise tail forward,
bottom forward, and random or varied orientations. The discrepancies for the left side of the vehicle
could be due to inspection errors; possibly the "other" velocity vector orientations are responsible for the
unexpected distribution.
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Figure 7 and Figure 8 plot the mean impact rates by altitude and inclination. The altitude does not
appear to be a factor in determining impact rate, but the high inclination missions have significantly
higher impact rates than the 28.5 degree flights. Environment models predict that debris impacts at high
inclinations will result in deeper craters than the same particle at a lower inclination, because of the
differing relative speeds at the different inclinations.
2.2 Removal count
As shown in Figure 4, the replacement rate has not varied much over the history of the Shuttle
program. The rate is plotted in Figure 9, which shows the flight-by-flight variations, the average for the
whole program, and the predicted rate. The replacement rate predicted by the contractor at the
beginning of the program only considered micro-meteoroid impacts, but used a penetration equation for
fused silica that has since been shown to predict much deeper craters than more recently developed
equations 2. Therefore, the predicted rate of replacement, which includes consideration of the impact rate
as well as the effects of the damage on window strength, is reasonably close to the actual rate, which is
due to the micrometeoroid and the man-made debris environments.
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As stated earlier, whether or not a window is replaced after an impact pit is discovered depends on
the stress analysis and life assessment performed by KSC and JSC engineers. Because of the nature of
the window system design, the side and overhead windows are the most sensitive to impact damage.
Figure10showsthatthesidewindowshavebeenreplacedthemostfrequently.Thesensitivityof these
windowsisespeciallyobviousfortheoverheads,wherealmosteveryimpactdaJnagehasresultedina
windowreplacement.Figure11showsthedistributionofimpactdepthsforall impactsandforimpact
pitsthatresultedin windowreplacement.
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3.0 Environment analysis
The question is often raised: what was it that hit the window? The normal inspection technique
does not go beyond measuring the dimensions of the pit. In most cases, there is no evidence of the
original projectile visible in the crater, although there is often dirt on the window that is mistaken for
projectile material. The only way to absolutely determine the source of the impact is to perform a
Scanning Electron Microscope (SEM) analysis, and this requires destruction of the window in order to
get the pit into the microscope stage. For the eleven windows specially analyzed in this way, Table I
shows the results. 3 For three of these windows, not enough of the projectile remained in the crater for a
determination of the projectile material, but the majority of these impacts were man-made debris.
Another way to examine impact pits and determine some facts about the projectile has been
developed through research in the JSC Hypervelocity Impact Test Facility (HITF). In this research, 65
disks of fused silica glass were used as targets in a light gas gun. Each disk was shot once, with a
varietyof projectilediametersandmaterialsandwithinarangeof velocitiesfrom2km/sto8km/s.
Measurementsof thepitdiametersanddepthsweremadewiththesametechniqueusedatKSCon
Shuttlewindows.Thediametersanddepthswerethenanalyzedtodetermineapenetrationequationfor
fusedsilica.4 Figure 12 shows the spaU diameters plotted as a function of the impact's normal
momentum. The equation relating spall diameter to momentum is:
DI _-.0184 (mpV*p)._ (1)
This equation is 88% correlated. A similar relationship exists between spall diameter and impact
energy, but the penetration depth and impact parameters are not yet correlated with any comparable
confidence.
Mission
STS-7
STS 41D
Window Pit Dia.
Right middle .14"
Left side .075
STS 41G Left side .053
STS 41G Right forward .089
STS 61B Left side .02
STS-30
STS-31
Right side .10
Right side .055
STS-50 Right forward .28
STS-50 L. Overhead
STS-50 Right side .033
.0605
STS-59 side hatch .44
Pit Origin
Depth
.0171" paint chip
.008 debris
.007 debris
.0113 micrometeoroid
.0009 micrometeoroid
.0115 unknown
.01 unknown
.0224 titanium
(debris)
.00286 unknown
.00447 micrometeoroid
.0222 paint chip
Table I
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By using this well correlated relationship between impact momentum ,and spall diameter, ,an
investigator can make certain deductions about the projectile source for any particular impact. The low-
earth orbit projectile enviromnent consists of natural material traveling through the solar system and
man-made debris orbiting around the earth. The natural material can have velocities relative to the
Space Shuttle ranging from 0 to 70 km/s, according to some scientists. The man-made debris is limited
to a maximum velocity of two times orbital speed, or about 14 km/s. The two types of projectiles also
have different densities in most cases; natural material is low density, and man-made debris is mostly
alloy pieces, with densities ranging from aluminum to steel ,and denser metals.
SEM analysis of the eleven windows described above has also indicated that the impact velocity
range can be deduced from evidence of melted glass in the crater (see [4]). The properties of fused
silica give a lower bound for material melting to occur at impacts around 6 krn/s. Faster impacts will
result in qualitatively different craters than slower, displaying more molten silica and less cracking and
crazing under SEM examination. Figure 13 plots the distribution of the estimated projectile diameters,
based on assumptions about the impact parameters of debris particles and micrometeoroids, and using
equation (1).
5O
Diameter distribution I
Estimatedprojecl_led_me_rs I
40
'_ 30
Q.
*6 2O
0
IE-07 1E_06 1E-05 00001 0.001
diameter {m)
oot
assume debns velocity = 10 km/s, density = 2.8 g/cc
assume m.meteomid velecity = 20 km/s, density = 5 g/cc
-- debris I
- re.meteoroid J
Figure 13
4.0 Remedies and research
4.1 Improving inspection techniques
With the increase in Shuttle mission length and the renewed emphasis on efficient operations at
KSC, NASA has been developing an automated, digital inspection technique. This new system will
attach to the Orbiter structure outside a window. A camera system will scan the entire surface of the
window, recording any defect in the surface that exceeds the appropriate criteria. The images will be
recorded digitally for review by a technician and stored in a log of the window pane's history. The
equipment necessary to do the scanning and digitizing is widely available; the hardware and software
developments for measuring feature depth are the remaining challenges.
This new equipment will remove the inspector from the most tedious part of the job, the detailed
inspection of the window surfaces. This will hopefully reduce human errors in detecting impacts. It
may also replace our current technique of pit measurement, using digital technology instead of mold
impressions.Inadditionto theexpectedimprovementi problemreporting,theimpactdatabasecan
thenincludemanysmallerfeatures,insteadofonlythosedeemed"reportable"byourflightsafety
concerns.KSCexpectsto implementthenewequipmentsoon.
4.2 Changing mission planning and operations
While tracking the impact data for the Shuttle windows, it became clear that certain missions were
more damaging than others. The relationship between impact rate and vehicle attitude was examined.
We concluded the obvious: flying with the windows pointing into the ram projectile flux would result in
more window impacts.
Planning vehicle attitudes for a Shuttle mission involves many considerations other than avoiding
window impacts, such as navigation, communications, satellite rendezvous, astronomy, earth
observations, thermal conditioning, waste management, etc. However, we found that there were many
times when a default orientation was selected, and that frequently this default orientation put the
windows into the velocity vector. A flight rule was written requiring a default attitude that protects the
windows. Such an orientation is always selected unless other mission requirements supersede the rule.
This rule was implemented beginning with STS-53, in December 1992.
The effect of this new rule can be seen in Figure 8. STS-53 occurred around 320 cumulative days
on that graph, where the replacement rate dropped off slightly. Around the same time of this rule
change, the inspection procedures were reviewed and improved (see Figure 4). The possible changes in
replacement rate due improvements in flight operations might have been mitigated by the more
strenuous inspection. Also, recent mission planning might be precluding window protective attitudes
because of other mission requirements.
4.3 Changing analysis techniques
The research effort described in section 3.0 was undertaken partly to derive a better definition of the
relationship between impact pits and the window's residual strength. The techniques currently in use
predict low strengths and result in more windows being replaced than may be necessary. 5 No change to
the current techniques will be made until NASA has confidence that a new analysis method will provide
the same level of risk or better. Continuing research is focusing on identifying exactly what part of the
impact crater controls the residual strength of the glass, and how this feature is related to known impact
parameters. 6
4.4 Retesting removed windows
Because our analysis techniques predict window strength much lower than it actually is, we have
initiated a program to recertify scrapped windows for flight. Damaged windows are returned to the
vendor and put through a proof test procedure similar to the acceptance testing they experienced before
they were delivered to NASA. This new effort should result in more reusable windows for the Shuttle
program. It is expected that a very large percentage of damaged windows will pass the screening test
and be reinstated into the spares supply.
4.5 Designing a better window
The Shuttle thermal panes function quite well as impact shields for the pressure panes. The small
damages found on these external windows are not a danger to crew safety during the flight in which
they occur; the windows are replaced during vehicle maintenance because the stresses of the next flight
might cause the damaged thermal pane to fracture. It has been suggested several times in the history of
this program to use thicker glass in the thermal pane, so that the window would not be as sensitive to
suchsmallimpacts.Thismodificationwouldcertainlyresultin fewerwindowreplacements,buta
thicker window would just raise the threshold of minimum crater depth before replacement is required.
There will always be impacts that damage a window too much.
The Shuttle has never experienced an orbital impact that penetrated the windows or caused a
through crack in the thermal pane. An impact of this magnitude would penetrate the aluminum skin of
the fuselage as well, so the windows are not the most sensitive part of the vehicle. Thicker glass in the
thermal pane would not increase the safety of the vehicle to any discemable degree.
The Space Station program has designed their windows to have a replaceable sacrificial pane
protecting the pressure windows. This fused silica pane does not have to carry any thermal loads or
pressure loads, so it is a thinner piece of glass than the Shuttle thermal panes. Space Station
maintenance is expected to include replacing this sacrificial pane only as it becomes necessary to
improve visibility through the window.
5.0 Summary
This review of the Shuttle windows' impact history has shown that the orbital environment is an
important element in the design of a space vehicle. Shuttle maintenance and safety are both affected
quite significantly by the number of particles present in low earth orbit and by the operational decisions
made when flying through them. High inclination missions are worse than low, as the environment
models predict, which indicates, along with Table I, that man-made debris particles are causing the
majority of window impacts. NASA is trying several strategies to reduce the maintenance costs
generated by this environment.
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